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University of Nottingham 
 
Abstract:   
 
The House of Lords Post-Legislative Scrutiny Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 reported 
on 13 March 2014.  This paper considers the findings and recommendations of the Committee, and 
in particular its two key recommendations  W the establishment of an independent oversight body to 
co-ordinate implementation of the Act, and the need to develop a replacement for the present 
deprivation of liberty safeguards (DOLS). 
 
Introduction  
 
The House of Lords Post-Legislative Scrutiny Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 reported 
on 13 March 2014.  This paper considers the findings and recommendations of the Committee.  The 
government is to respond to the report later this spring; no doubt there will be more to be said at 
that time. 
 
The overall finding of the Committee is ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞDĞŶƚĂůĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞƌĞŝŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘D ? ?is 
a good and progressive piece of legislation.  That view reflects the overwhelming bulk of the 
evidence submitted to the Committee, which supported the principles, ethos and key provisions of 
the MCA.  The exception to this is ƚŚĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ? ‘K>^ ? ?ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?
which the Report finds to be overly complex, and not understood or reliably used by the relevant 
professionals.  The Committee recommends that the DOLS should be replaced with a new system, 
following widespread consultation and effective Parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƚƐǀiew of the 
implementation of the MCA is much more critical.  While the Committee finds instances of good 
practice, the Report also catalogues poor compliance in a wide variety of areas, and provides a range 
of recommendations for improvement.   A number of these will be noted below.  In addition to these 
specific concerns, however, the Committee found an absence of leadership in government:  no one 
body was charged with implementation of the MCA.  To address this, the Report proposes the 
formation of an independent oversight body representing the range of stakeholders and reporting 
directly to Parliament.  The body would not be a regulator, but rather work with the various 
stakeholders to promote, improve, co-ordinate and monitor implementation of the MCA.   
 
The Report proposes that these two main recommendations would be followed up by the Liaison 
Committee in one year, to ensure progress towards their realisation.   
 
                                                          
1 While Professor Bartlett was the Specialist Advisor to the Committee, this paper is written in a personal 
capacity, and any views expressed that extend beyond the content of the report itself are those of Professor 
Bartlett and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee. 
The Scope and Methods of the Committee 
 
dǁŽƉŽŝŶƚƐĂƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛreport in context.  The first is that the report is 
post-legislative scrutiny.  The objective of the exercise is therefore not to re-fight old battles, but 
rather to determine whether the Act is operating as Parliament had intended (House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞƌĞŝŶĂĨƚĞƌĐŝƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ?As such,
it is largely a fact-finding mission.  Consistent with that, while the report provides an evidence base 
for its recommendations, the recommendations themselves are often open-ended.  The DOLS 
recommendation and the proposal for an independent oversight body are good examples of this.  
While the Report is clear why those recommendations are made, they are not overly prescriptive.  
The DOLS recommendation is that proper law and policy need to be developed, and the role of the 
independent oversight body is articulated in relatively broad terms.  These are the beginnings of 
discussion, not foreclosings of discussion. 
 
The focus on the consistency of functioning with Parliamentary intent does mean that some issues 
are left largely outside the scope of the Report.  For example, the big new factor in international law 
is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, 
A/61/611), which came into effect in 2008.  While some evidence to the Committee and some 
academic commentary suggests that the MCA may well not be compliant with the Convention, (see, 
eg., MDAC (2013), Bartlett (2012), 761-7; Fennell and Khaliq (2011), 667-71) and while some of the 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůŵŽǀĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĞƚŚŽƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?
compliance per se was not examined by the Committee in detail.   It is currently being examined 
separately by the Ministry of Justice. 
 
ThĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůƉŽŝŶƚĨůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ PƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝƚƐZĞƉŽƌƚĂƌĞ
evidence led.  A total of 216 submissions, running to 1800 pages of evidence were submitted to the 
Committee, and more than 40 witnesses gave oral evidence.  The evidence is available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/mental-capacity-act-
2005/publications/.  Notwithstanding this extensive portfolio, the evidence to the Committee 
tended to focus on matters of personal care and medical treatment.  Much less was received, for 
example, regarding property affairs, although that constitutes the bulk of the work of the Court of 
Protection.  Very little was received about some sectors, such as policing and banking.  Because of 
the lack of evidence the Report says little about those sectors.  They remain, to a considerable 
degree, terra incognita.  The Report does warn that  ‘ŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŚĞĂƌĚĂŶĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?ǁĞ
would caution against assuming that a lack of evidence suggests that the Act is working well in those 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?ZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? and almost certainly that warning is well-placed.  Whatever the merits of 
the Report, much remains to be investigated. 
 
A Good Act, Poorly Implemented 
 
The Committee considers that the MCA itself is a progressive piece of legislation, with the potential 
to transform lives for the better.  Its overarching principles remained relevant, empowering people 
who lack capacity to make decisions for themselves and providing carers of those people with an 
appropriate structure of decision-making (Report, para 12).   
 
While there is a lack of systematic monitoring of implementation, a matter itself of considerable 
concern to the Committee, the evidence submitted indicated that implementation of the Act was 
often poor, with professional and non-professional carers either unaware of the MCA, or failing 
successfully to implement its provisions.  Too often, the empowering ethos of the MCA gave way to 
concerns of paternalism, risk and safeguarding, with decisions taken to overrule P ?Ɛ2 wishes and 
feelings rather than to support them.  At the same time, the presumption of capacity is found 
sometime to have become an excuse for the provision of substandard care or indeed the denial of 
care entirely, on the basis of a highly suspect view that P was agreeing and had capacity to agree to 
such inappropriate care.  TŚŝƐǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĞǀŝĚĞŶƚǁŚĞŶW ?ƐŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞĐŚŽŝĐĞǁŽƌŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
financial advantage of a service provider (Report, para 61-64).  Capacity assessments, when they 
occurred, seemed to be triggered by perceived risk or an unusual event such as P becoming 
obstreperous or violent (Report, para 78-9, 85-90).  When they occurred, capacity assessments are 
found to be often carried out by professionals that may lack the relevant expertise in the specific 
condition affecting P, or are not closely associated with the care of P (Rport, para 67-73).  
 
There was little evidence of supported decision-making, notwithstanding its express requirement in 
the MCA (Report, para 80-83; see MCA s 1(3), 3(2), 4(4)). 
 
 ‘ĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŝƐĨŽƵŶĚďǇƚŚĞŽmmittee generally to be given its lay or clinical meaning, rather 
than the specific meaning defined in s 4 of the MCA.  The result of this was often the exclusion of 
family members and similar carers from best interests determinations, in particular when they 
challenged professional decision-making (Report, para 92-3; cf MCA s 4(7), which specifically 
requires the involvement of such carers in the best interests determination).  The question of who 
was responsible for determining best interests was also poorly understood, with a mistaken belief 
that the general defence provided in s 5 of the MCA created a positive authority for third parties to 
ĂĐƚŝŶW ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ (Report, para 97-101).  The question of whether the proposed 
intervention was the least restrictive alternative is also found to be inadequately considered.  As 
ǁŝƚŚŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚǁŝƐĚŽŵŽĨW ?ƐŽǁŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝƐĨŽƵŶĚƚŽĨŝŐƵƌĞ
ůĂƌŐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐW ?Ɛempowerment. 
 
The mechanisms for advance planning are also found to be weakly implemented.  While the number 
of Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPA) is rising, the Committee found that there are still issues about 
public knowledge of their availability, and the ease and expense of registration of such instruments.  
The Committee noted concerns regarding the extent of financial abuse by holders of LPAs, whether 
this flowed from lack of knowledge as to their responsibilities or other factors (Report, para 186-
187).  Insofar as it is possible to know (data is not gathered systematically), advance decisions to 
refuse treatment are relatively little used.  And for both these mechanisms, the Committee noted 
problems as to how carers would find out about these instruments at the time they needed to be 
relied upon. 
 
In addressing these issues, the Committee was particularly enthusiastic about the use of 
Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs), favouring a move towards structured 
professionalization and accreditation of individuals to perform the service, coupled with an 
expansion of the role.  It also noted a conflict of interest whereby the commissioners of IMCA were 
likely to be the same bodies as were subject to the IMCAs advocacy, with some evidence suggesting 
that IMCA advocacy was sometimes compromised as a result (Report, para 171).  The Committee 
considered that the costs of an expanded role for IMCAs would be met from complex decisions not 
escalating into court or other expensive decision fora.   
 
Getting the Word Out:  Standards and Compliance 
 
The Committee makes a number of proposals to address these issues.  At their core is a view that no 
single person or entity in government has overall responsibility for the implementation of the MCA.  
                                                          
2 Consistent with the usage of the MCA, a person lacking (or, depending on context, thought to be lacking) 
capacity is referred to herein as P. 
This is an Act that affects a diverse range of government departments and people and organisations 
in the private and third sectors; the Committee views a co-ordinated approach to implementation as 
essential.  To this end, it recommends the establishment of an independent oversight body, 
reporting directly to Parliament, and charged with co-ordinating, promoting, and monitoring the 
implementation of the MCA.  This would not be a regulator (although it would work closely with 
regulators), and would not be intended to remove overall ministerial responsibility for the Act.  It 
would rather be a supportive body, working with the range of stakeholders, both governmental and 
non-governmental and including service users and their families.  It would in part have a 
cheerleading function, to further implementation of the Act and would also ensure that appropriate 
monitoring is undertaken, to provide a better evidence base for gauging the success of 
implementation.  It would be independent of government, existing either as its own separate entity 
or as part of a broader body. 
 
In a sense, this body would become the pivot point for a number of the other recommendations of 
the Committee.  For example, the Committee was critical of the information strategy that has been 
used to further compliance with the MCA.  While the two relevant Codes of Practice may be 
readable, it was found to be less obvious that they were being read, and in any event they were now 
out of date.  The Committee does not recommend that they be re-written in their current form, but 
instead recommends that the strategy for information provision be re-thought, taking into account 
the diverse needs and audiences relevant to the MCA.  This would be commenced under the existing 
MCA Steering Group, but would eventually fall within the remit of the independent oversight body 
(Report, para 156-162).   
 
The expectation is that implementation initiatives would be launched into the range of domains 
where the MCA is relevant.  Sometimes this would be the general public (for example, trumpeting 
the availability of advance decisions to refuse treatment and LPAs).  Sometimes it would be in 
professional domains where the MCA is thought to be relevant but where there is little awareness or 
culture of implementation (the lack of evidence makes identifying these problematic, but perhaps 
banks and the police will serve as examples).  Sometimes it will be in areas where there has been at 
least some awareness of the relevance of the MCA (medical contexts, care homes, and local 
authorities for example).  Sometimes the independent body might undertake the initiative itself, but 
often it would be expected that it would work with professional organisations as part of the general 
requirements of professional training.  The Committee recommends, for example, that the General 
Medical Council and Royal Colleges take a more assertive role in ensuring standards of 
understanding and implementation in the medical professions (Report, paa 128-142).  The role of 
the independent oversight body would be to work with such bodies to ensure that appropriate 
initiatives are taken, and also to ensure consistency between initiatives.  Such consistency may be 
important not merely for theoretical, but for very practical reasons:  a nurse working in a care home 
may be subject to two or more sets of guidance from different sources; they must impose consistent 
expectations.  Similarly, the role of the CQC, both in setting standards and inspection, is perceived by 
the Committee as of considerable importance, and the Committee welcomes the renewed interest 
of the CQC in engagement with the MCA (Report, para 120-127).  This renewed interest arose only in 
2013, however, so it is too early to gauge its actual effects. 
 
The independent oversight body would also be expected to work with ADASS and NHS England to 
develop commissioning arrangements that will ensure MCA compliance.  The commissioning 
requirements promulgated by NHS England do include references to the MCA, but the Committee 
notes that these are intrinsically linked to safeguarding functions rather than empowerment, and 
focus on structures rather than outcomes in practice (Report, para 143-153).  Overall, the 
Committee proposes a express inclusion of the MCA in the NHS Mandate, and a clearer set of 
expectations regarding the MCA in commissioning documents. 
 The CQC collects data systematically on the use of the DOLS, but other than that, there is little by 
way of systematic evidence-gathering regarding the implementation and effects of the MCA.  The 
independent oversight body would be expected to address this.  The MCA was expected to 
introduce a new culture of care not merely among professionals, but in society as a whole.  The 
independent oversight body would be expected to establish benchmarks to measure this on a 
periodic basis.  Within professional circles and specific care contexts, it would further collect data to 
provide a clearer understanding of how the MCA is actually being used. 
 
The Committee favours IMCAs, but notes that there is evidence of inconsistent provision, and 
inconsistent calibre.  It recommends that IMCAs should be increasingly professionalised, and that 
standards of training ought to be introduced for them.  It is proposed that this, too, would fall under 
the remit of the independent oversight body. 
 
The independent oversight body would report to Parliament on an annual basis.   
 
Access to Justice:  The Court of Protection 
 
While noting problems of delay and perceived remoteness of the Court of Protection, the 
Committee was broadly sympathetic to the ŽƵƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ (Report, chapter 6), considering and 
specifically not recommending that it be replaced or supplemented with a tribunal.  It applauds and 
encourages recent moves towards greater transparency, proposes improved online resources, and 
recommends the appointment of additional authorised officers as a mechanism to reduce delays in 
non-contentious matters.  It further recommends the implementation of the proposals of the ad hoc 
Rules Committee of 2010.   
 
The Committee makes a number of recommendations relevant to access to justice in the Court.  It 
finds that the duty on public authorities to bring cases before the Court is not always well-known, 
and is not clear in its scope, and it recommends that these issues be tackled by the government in 
conjunction with the proposed independent oversight body.  It proposes that court processes are 
appropriate in situations where all carers agree with a decision taken, but P himself or herself 
objects to it.  It further proposes improved legal aid, and improved funding for the Official Solicitor. 
 
The Committee further proposes the establishment of mediation procedures within the Court, 
suggesting that the Office of the Public Guardian is well-placed to house such a service at least as 
relates to matters of property and affairs.  Mediation is proposed in part because of its own merits, 
but also to limit the financial exposure of P to litigation in matters of property and affairs, where P 
normally provides the costs for all parties, even if P did not commence the litigation. 
 
It is also proposed that s 44 of the MCA, the offence of ill-treating a person lacking capacity, be re-
drafted.  This is following criticism of the drafting from the Court of Appeal:  see R v Dunn [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2935, R v Hopkins and R v Priest [2011] EWCA Crim 1513, R v Hopkins and R v Priest 
[2011] EWCA Crim 1513. 
 
DOLS 
 
The ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞK>^ǁŝůůďĞƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŽƌŬŝng in the 
field.  The DOLS are said to be unduly complicated,  and not understood or owned by the people on 
the ground who would commence the processes by requesting a standard authorisation.  The 
marked inconsistency of their use in the various regions of the country is noted, along with the 
overall minimal usage in the country as a whole.  Unlike the broader MCA, which was viewed with 
broad approval in the evidence, the DOLS were roundly subjected to criticism in the submissions to 
the Committee.  The ComŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞis to recommend that the existing regime be scrapped, 
and new legislation introduced following appropriate consultation and proper parliamentary 
scrutiny (Report, para 256-278). 
 
While the Committee does not foreclose the discussion of what should replace the DOLS, it does 
provide some frameworks or starting points.  It continues to see the issue as flowing from HL v the 
United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32  ?ƚŚĞ ‘Bournewood ?ĐĂƐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƚƵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů
DOLS framework.  This case places the difficulty squarely within the context of Article 5 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR), 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐǁŚĞŶĂ ‘ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ŝƐĂƚŝƐƐƵĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĂƚArticle.  
Consistent with that approach, the Committee does not recommend a statutory definition of 
 ‘ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƌ ůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ,ZũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ 
(Report, para 279-283).  The Committee further recommends that the replacement provisions 
reflect the principles of the main MCA (Report, para 274), and proposes that the role of the Relevant 
WĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞďĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ (Report, para 286-288).  It is recommended that the new 
system further extend to supported accommodation in the community, not merely to hospitals and 
care homes (Report, para 294-297). 
 
The DOLS provisions will no doubt be among the most discussed proposals of the Committee.  The 
Committee, quite properly given its mandate, was guided by the evidence it received.  Any move to 
a replacement for the DOLS will show up some of the tensions in that evidence, however.  The 
placement of the issue within the context of HL and Article 5 for example (an approach uniformly 
adopted by the evidence) is problematic.  As the Committee notes (Report, para 284-285), this 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŵĂǇƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚĞƚŚĞƵŶŚĞůƉĨƵůĂŶĚƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝƐŝŶŐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?
taken by carers suggest often incorrectly the provision of substandard care.  At least as 
problematically, it implicitly characterises the DOLS as a response to a technical legal problem, 
rather than a mechanism that can provide real benefits in care to service users.  Insofar as it is 
perceived as a technical legal problem, it is difficult to see how it will be owned with any enthusiasm 
by the carers who are pivotal to its implementation.  It may perhaps be more helpful, as the 
discussions commence, to move away from questions about the scope of Article 5 and begin to ask 
under what circumstances an outside view of the care we provide may be of real benefit to P, and 
work from there. 
 
As we do so, at least two themes that are of overarching importance in the implementation of the 
MCA generally will re-arise.  The first, as the Committee notes, is the relationship between 
safeguarding/paternalism and empowerment.  While the Committee quite properly wants to see an 
ethos of empowerment in the DOLS replacement, many of the most visible cases will occur in the 
context of safeguarding applications.  The concern is that the context of risk analysis will over-power 
any ethos of empowerment in the individual case.  This clearly requires a values-based discussion 
about how empowerment can exist in a situation of risk.  It may also, perhaps, require a discussion 
of whether proper safeguarding legislation may be appropriate so that these cases are removed 
from the MCA.  The Law Commission had originally proposed that safeguarding be dealt with 
through an amended guardianship regime under the Mental Health Act 1983 (see Law Commission 
(1995), part IX); it may be appropriate to re-visit that question. 
 
Second, decisions under the Act are only meaningful in the context of a range of options.  
Particularly in a time of austerity and restraint, availability of such options may well be inseparable 
from the MCA issues.  The MCA, of course, provides no right to services, but if some way to address 
the availability of services coincident with the MCA determinations is not found, there is a real risk 
that the MCA determinations may become irrelevant:  it is not obvious how much discussion there 
can be of best interests, when there is only one option on the table. 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19, which 
was issued less than a week after the House of Lords report, is both a blessing and a problem for the 
development of a replacement DOLS framework.  That decision, consistent with the ECHR 
jurisprudence, ƚĂŬĞƐĂƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇďƌŽĂĚǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐĂ
relatively large number of people in care homes and hospitals will be affected.  On the one hand, 
this re-enforces the urgency of the House of Lords recommendation:  it is vital that an appropriate 
and workable system be developed for these people.  At the same time, the urgency may create 
problems.  It was, after all, the urgency that resulted from the HL decision ten years ago that gave us 
the existing unsatisfactory system; it would be unfortunate if urgency flowing from Cheshire West 
had the same effect.  The urgency is however real:  there are a considerable number of people now 
deprived of liberty (and who in some cases may have been deprived of liberty for some years) who 
are subject to no legal authorisation for that.  That is, to put it mildly, a problem.  The other 
possibility is that supervisory bodies will make a real attempt to implement the existing DOLS.  While 
that is perhaps the best outcome in the short term, it raises problems in the longer term, as such 
bodies are told after having invested energy in making the DOLS work that those processes are to be 
replaced with something else, the DOLS replacement.  That transition would have considerable 
morale costs. 
 
Roads Not Travelled 
 
While the Committee report is broad in its application, there are matters that it does not address.   
 
Some of these flow from a lack of evidence.  Some of those, as noted above, are about sectors 
where the MCA may or may not be being implemented.  Interestingly, there was very little 
systematic evidence provided as to the case law of the Court of Protection, and that case law is 
therefore largely unanalysed by the Report.  This is perhaps unfortunate, as that case law arguably 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?dŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƐ
clear that there is no ranking of the statutory criteria in the determination of best interests (see Re 
M [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam)), and a number of Court of Protection decisions are reported where no 
reference is made to the preferences of the individual either at the time of the decision or when 
competent.  While the recent Supreme Court decision in Aintree University Hospital Foundation 
Trust v James [2013] EWCA Civ 65 may perhaps redress this balance somewhat, even that case refers 
more to placing P at the centre of the decision rather than focussing on the specific factors of s 4 of 
the MCA.  It is thus at best arguable whether the jurisprudence furthers empowerment rather than 
safeguarding or paternalism. 
 
A surprise for me when I read the evidence and went back to re-read the Law Commission report 
and similar documents that commenced the process leading to the enactment of the MCA was the 
way in which social care professionals had become integrated into the process.  The Law 
Commission report seems at times to think professionals will be largely absent:  their vision was of a 
statute that would give families and similar carers a coherent and legally sound framework for 
decisions to be made about their loved ones lacking capacity.  In that context, there is an irony that 
the Committee report notes on numerous occasions how the MCA has had the reverse effect, 
freezing families out of care decisions.  The significant involvement of professionals is not necessarily 
a criticism of the way things have developed (although any marginalisation of P and his or her 
domestic carers is of course a matter of concern).  There may be much to be said for using 
professionals, who may be expected to have a more developed understanding of the legislation, to 
ensure consistency of application.  For present purposes, the more interesting question concerns the 
present economic context.  At a time of austerity, it seems likely that there will be increasing 
pressure on the professionals and NGOs who have up to now piloted implementation of the Act.  
,ŽǁƚŚŝƐǁŝůůƉůĂǇŽƵƚŝƐŶŽƚǇĞƚĐůĞĂƌ ?dŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŶĞǁ
organisation at the centre of implementation, but otherwise spread implementation out broadly, to 
many professionals and organisations.  This might well be an effective strategy in times of restraint.  
It might also be the case, however, that we see a de-professionalization of implementation, with 
responsibility reverting back onto families with relatively little professional advice provided.  In a 
sense, this may be closer to what the Law Commission envisaged, but it is not clear what it would 
mean for implementation overall. 
 
Further, increasingly the use of capacity itself is being called into question, and issues are arising as 
to whether there are new directions in which legislation should be moving.  This in part flows from 
the UN CRPD, as discussed above, but it is not restricted to that context.  Ideas develop over time.  
Denzil Lush, the Senior Judge of the Court of Protection, made the point with particular clarity in his 
evidence to the Committee: 
 
[I]n a way the Mental Capacity Act represents thinking from the early 1990s. We have 
tended in this country to change our legislation on mental capacity, probably once every 
generation, or every 25 years. I could bore you with details of statutes going back to 1860. 
Every 25 or 30 years there has been a change. In particular, this Act predates the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I am not entirely convinced that the 
Act is compliant with Article 12 of that 8 convention, so one might explore statutory 
amendments that gave a wider range of powers to the court, rather similar to the Bill just 
published in the Irish Republic enabling assisted decision-making and possibly co-decision-
making agreements. (Lush, 2013, q 294) 
 
The Committee report was post-legislative scrutiny:  its role was not to generate new ideas about 
where legislation should go, but rather to assess the implementation and effects of the statute as it 
was passed.  That does not of course mean that this forward thinking should stop; indeed, if Judge 
>ƵƐŚ ?ƐĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐǇŝƐĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞĐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚdebates regarding the legislation to arise 
soon (as, indeed, they are already in the context of the CRPD).  While the Committee report is a 
significant achievement, it is unlikely to be the last word on the subject. 
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